The Russian state has systematically developed and refined a comprehensive architecture of information‑control that spans legal, technical and administrative dimensions.
At its core lies the attempt to reshape the internet within Russia — commonly referred to as the "RuNet" — into a space that is heavily regulated, with diminished access to independent and foreign information flows, increased monitoring of user communications, and strong incentives for citizens to migrate to domestically‑controlled platforms.
While the roots of this phenomenon stretch back over a decade, the pace, breadth and technical sophistication of Russia's approach have accelerated markedly since the onset of the full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, sanctions and withdrawal of many Western companies, and mounting geopolitical isolation.
Russia's regulatory architecture for the internet rests on multiple interlocking legal instruments, state agencies and technical requirements. According to the Wikipedia entry on internet censorship in Russia, one of the core mechanisms is a centralised "single register" of blocked domain names, URLs and IP addresses maintained by the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor).
Initially introduced in 2008, this register targeted websites with content such as drug‑abuse instructions, suicide methods or child pornography, but was later expanded to include so‑called "extremist" material — a category used broadly by the authorities to include criticism of government policy or wartime conduct.
Further, Russia's legal framework includes laws that require internet service providers (ISPs), hosting providers, and platforms to register, share data, implement content‑removal procedures, and comply with block‑lists and takedown requests. For example, amendments to the Law on Information introduced in February 2021 oblige social media platforms to proactively monitor and remove content that offends "society, the state, state symbols or public officials," or is disseminated by organizations deemed "undesirable."
The 2019 "sovereign internet" law is another cornerstone. Under this law, the state aims to ensure that the Russian segment of the internet can operate in isolation from the global internet, if required.
In practice, this law enables the authorities to consolidate control over internet architecture so as to block or reroute traffic, intercept or decrypt data, and regulate routing and domains under state supervision. According to the Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, the equipment mandatorily installed in networks of nearly all Russian ISPs has become a powerful tool of state censorship and surveillance.
Institutionally, Roskomnadzor plays the central regulatory and enforcement role; it is empowered to issue block orders, to pressure platforms and hosting providers, to demand removal of "undesirable" or "extremist" content, and to oversee the compliance of ISPs and platforms. The HRW report observes that ISPs have faced fines or criminal liability for failing to install required equipment (the so‑called TSPU — "technical means to counter threats") or direct traffic as prescribed by the authorities.
These legal and institutional tools have been reinforced by sanctions, law amendments, and regulatory pressure since 2022. For instance, fines for non‑compliance by internet service providers can amount to up to three years in prison under Article 274.2 of the Criminal Code for repeated violations.
The regulatory environment thus forms a dual system: on the one hand, a formally legal framework of content deletion, blocking and licensing; on the other, a vast technical and infrastructural control system that enables the state to shape the internet experience of users, often behind the scenes and without meaningful transparency or accountability.
Legal powers alone cannot achieve effective censorship; infrastructure, routing, network control, domain system management, and traffic monitoring are essential. The HRW report places great emphasis on how the Russian authorities have methodically consolidated control over the technical architecture of RuNet.
One key development is the introduction and expansion of ISPs' obligation to provide detailed data on their internet‑exchange points (IXPs) and peer connections, allowing the state to map and manage traffic flows. Wikipedia notes that the number of valid telecommunications licences in Russia halved between 2016 and April 2025, reflecting consolidation of service providers into fewer, larger entities more easily subject to state control.
Another major dimension is the creation of a national Domain Name System (DNS) alternative, which allows the state to redirect or block websites by manipulating the translation of domain names into IP addresses. This system was mandated for use by ISPs since January 2021 and is managed by a state‑affiliated body.
Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates are also under state influence; by establishing state‑controlled certificate authorities, the authorities can decrypt or intercept traffic that may otherwise be encrypted. Wikipedia notes that Russian users have reported being prompted to install state certificates when using domestic websites, which raises significant privacy and interception risks.
The HRW report describes equipment known as TSPU installed across ISP networks, which allows for "deep packet inspection" (DPI), automated blocking or throttling of unwanted content, rerouting of traffic, and surveillance of communications.
During major events — political protests, elections, or other moments of civic mobilization — Russia has used internet shutdowns or large‑scale disruptions of mobile data and broadband access to stifle coordination or news flow. The HRW report states that "[a]ccording to some estimates about half of the country's population does not know how to use a VPN and only has access to websites and services not yet blocked by the Russian government."
The overall effect is that the Russian segment of the internet is gradually moving towards functional isolation, internal control and segmentation: a model in which access to foreign platforms is restricted, alternative domestic services are promoted, and the state has the means to surveil and intervene in traffic and communications at scale.
The practical manifestations of censorship and control are manifold: blocking of websites or domains, throttling of access speeds for certain platforms, large‑scale disruptions, targeted blocking of VPN services, and outright shutdowns of mobile or fixed internet in given regions. The HRW report emphasises that many Russians now rely on multiple VPNs to access foreign websites — yet there is no guarantee that any given VPN will work on a given day.
One example cited in the Wikipedia article involves the blocking of the messaging service Telegram in 2018: over 19 million IP addresses associated with the service were blocked after Telegram refused to hand over encryption keys to the Federal Security Service (FSB). The resulting collateral damage extended to Amazon Web Services and Google Cloud Platform due to Telegram's use of those services.
Another example, mentioned in the HRW report, is the slowing or blocking of popular foreign social‑media services. Since February 2022, the authorities have slowed down or blocked access to platforms that refuse to comply with censorship or data‑sharing laws.
Media outlets have recorded thousands of mobile internet shutdowns across Russia by mid‑2025. The Wikipedia page on 2025 internet restrictions states that in July 2025 alone there were over 2,099 shutdowns — exceeding the number recorded globally many times over.
In July 2025, for instance, the communications regulator blocked the internet‑speed testing service operated by Ookla, citing threats to internet infrastructure and recommending users switch to a domestic alternative.
These measures signal that censorship is no longer limited to content removal, but extends to structural manipulation of connectivity, routing, access and speed — and increasingly to forcing migration to domestic platforms.
The HRW report highlights that many Russians have effectively lost access to foreign websites and independent media; blocked pages now often yield "connection timeout" or similar messages, especially for opposition‑politics, human‑rights and independent media websites.
The Forum 18 article emphasises how religious websites are also targeted. Sites supporting LGBT+ people in religious communities, Ukraine‑based religious sites, or those of religious communities that are politically problematic (such as the Jehovah's Witnesses) have been blocked as "extremist materials".
The overall picture is one of a pervasive regime of disruption: users face unpredictability (VPNs may or may not work), access is increasingly directed to state‑approved alternatives, and digital spaces that once offered independent or foreign perspectives become progressively rarer or harder to reach.
Central to the Russian state's strategy is the promotion of domestic alternatives to global internet services, in part as a facet of what the state calls "digital sovereignty." The HRW report notes that as users find foreign platforms blocked, slowed or otherwise inconvenient, they are forced to switch to Russian browsers, social networks and messaging apps, which carries the risk that users' data is routed through channels more amenable to state surveillance.
Foreign tech companies are under increasing regulatory pressure. They face demands to remove content, share data with authorities, host services locally, comply with data‑storage laws, and open legal entities in Russia. Failure to comply triggers fines, blocking or throttling. For example, the Time article reports that in 2021 and 2022 Russia passed laws increasing fines on internet platforms and providers for failing to remove "unwanted" content — up to 10‑20 % of their annual turnover in Russia.
In June 2025, the state formally authorised the development of a state‑backed messaging application to compete with foreign apps like WhatsApp and Telegram, integrated with public services and designed for easier surveillance compliance.
In August 2025, Russian authorities announced partial restrictions on voice calls via WhatsApp and Telegram, citing non‑compliance with law‑enforcement demands. Users reported disrupted or blocked call functionality.
The Guardian reported on August 13 2025 that Russia has clamped down on both WhatsApp and Telegram calls, accusing them of failing to comply with Russian legal obligations and signalling an intensification of pressure on foreign‑based messaging platforms.
Blocking of the speed‑test application Ookla is likewise an example of targeting foreign services ostensibly for "security reasons," but in effect part of the larger digital‑sovereignty drive.
Foreign hosting providers, CDNs and other infrastructure companies are also affected: amendments to hosting‑service provider laws now require registration and compliance or face blocking — for example, Cloudflare, Amazon, and Fastly have been subject to Russian blocking or throttling.
Taken together, these pressures create a dual incentive: foreign platforms become harder to use in Russia (via blockings, throttling, regulatory risk) and domestic alternatives become more accessible (and sometimes compulsory), often with weaker privacy protections or stronger state oversight.
Freedom of religion and belief, and other dimensions of censorship Censorship in Russia is not limited to political dissent; it extends to religious freedom, information about minority beliefs, LGBT + advocacy, and independent religious media. The Forum 18 article of October 2024 highlights how religious websites have been blocked for "extremist content," especially when the state deems the organization or material to be on the Federal List of Extremist Materials. For example, Jehovah's Witnesses' literature and websites were blocked after their legal ban in 2017.
This has significant chilling effects: individuals seeking religious information, or activists publishing religious‑minority viewpoints, face restricted access, blocked platforms, or the deletion of their sites. Independent religious perspectives that deviate from the official narrative or that critique Russian state actions (for example with regard to Ukraine) are increasingly shut out.
The blocking of religious websites also demonstrates how the state leverages its broad "extremism" definition to silence not only political opposition or independent media but also religious and civil society voices. The confluence of religion, belief, minority rights and digital expression becomes entangled in the state's broader information‑control regime.
The consequences of this sweeping system of internet control are manifold. At the level of individual users, access to independent information is increasingly obstructed. As HRW indicates, many Russians no longer have access to foreign social media platforms, independent media websites or alternative political viewpoints without using VPNs — and many lack the skills or resources to do so.
Regional and local internet shutdowns, mobile‑data disruptions, or ISP‑level throttlings undermine citizens' ability to coordinate, to obtain news, to access services (including banking, ride‑hailing, payments) or to communicate freely. Wikipedia's 2025‑internet‑restrictions article notes that taxi‑drivers, train‑ticket buyers and other service‑users in rural areas suffered from mobile‑internet outages in June 2025.
From a privacy and surveillance perspective, the combination of mandated traffic‑monitoring equipment (TSPU), state‑managed certificate authorities, national DNS, ISP routing control and domestic platforms increases the risk that online communications will be intercepted, analysed or redirected. HRW emphasises that state efforts to control infrastructure "carry serious risks for rights and freedoms" because they enable mass surveillance and permanent censorship.
From a freedom‑of‑expression viewpoint, the state's policies violate Russia's obligations under international law — including the right to free expression, access to information, privacy of communications, and freedom of assembly. HRW explicitly identifies that Russia's internet‑shutdowns, censorship, and architectural consolidation contravene the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other treaties.
At the societal level, the drive towards digital isolation and control contributes to a narrowing of public debate, the weakening of independent media, and the entrenchment of state‑approved narratives. The promotion of domestic alternatives also tends to reduce exposure to dissenting voices or foreign information flows, thus tilting the information ecosystem toward state dominance.
In addition, religious minorities and marginalized groups — for whom independent online spaces may be especially critical — face further barriers when websites or platforms supporting their expressions are blocked or suppressed. The Forum 18 findings underscore that religious freedom is deeply affected by internet censorship in Russian contexts.
On the economic and rights‑of‑access front, internet reliability, speed and openness impact citizens' ability to take part in commerce, banking, mobility services, online education or culture. Disruptions, throttling or shutdowns hamper these functions and disproportionately affect those with fewer resources. The HRW report notes that internet disruptions have caused failed online banking transactions, difficulties in taxi‑hailing apps or other everyday utilities.
Thus, the infrastructure of digital censorship in Russia is not a narrow or narrow‑scope phenomenon; it reaches deeply into everyday lives, communication, commerce, religion, expression and civic participation.
While many of the foundational elements of Russia's internet censorship regime were already in place before 2022, the pace of escalation, sophistication of technical measures, and scale of disruption have increased markedly in the last few years.
For instance, according to Wikipedia's "2025 internet restrictions in Russia" page, in June 2025 some 655 shutdowns were recorded in Russia; by July the number had risen to over 2,099, exceeding the annual number of shutdowns worldwide documented in other countries.
On 30 July 2025, Reuters reported that Roskomnadzor blocked Ookla's Speedtest service, citing internet‑security threats and pointing users to a domestic alternative app. That action is emblematic of the push not only to block content or platforms, but to shape what services users can access — again driving toward domestic‑only ecosystems.
In August 2025, the regulator announced partial restrictions on WhatsApp and Telegram voice calls, justifying the actions in the name of combatting criminal scams and terrorism, but in effect leveraging these claims to tighten control over encrypted communications.
In November 2025, reports (via UNN) indicate that from March 1 2026, Roskomnadzor will receive "almost unlimited powers" to block websites and disconnect the Russian internet from the global network without court oversight.
These developments suggest the Russian state is moving deliberately toward a model of a fully sovereign, state‑controlled internet: one in which the global architecture is subordinated to national regulation, user traffic is increasingly routed or filtered through domestic networks, independent and foreign platforms are marginalized or coerced, and users' freedom to access information is severely constrained.
Experts quoted in Time and HRW describe the state's efforts as a "carving out" of Russia's internet — redirecting its architecture, reducing diversity of access, and turning it into a closed forum shaped by state imperatives.
The Time article noted specifically that one of the first large‑scale tests of Russia's throttling capability involved the platform formerly known as Twitter (now X). On 1 March 2022, Roskomnadzor dramatically throttled the platform for "spreading false information" about Ukraine, then fully blocked it. The authorities described the episode as an experiment in capabilities that can later be applied to more popular social networks.
In parallel, the consolidation of ISPs, the mapping of IXPs, the requirement for licensing and state control of hosting and domain systems have increased the state's visibility and control over the internet's backbone. HRW observes that these developments are less visible to ordinary users than a blocked website — but they matter profoundly for how control is exercised and how resilient the system of censorship and surveillance becomes.
Thus, while earlier periods of Russian internet regulation may have emphasised content removal or blocking of specific sites, the current environment is characterised by structural interventions: routing; domain and certificate control; large‑scale outages and directed traffic; substitution of foreign services; and the suppression of blocking‑circumvention tools such as VPNs.
Indeed, HRW notes that not only are VPNs routinely blocked or become unreliable, but "many Russian users juggle VPNs and web‑browsers to try to access foreign services — and often, no VPN will work on a given day."
The Forum 18 article emphasizes that the chilling effect on religious freedom and minority belief expression is already substantial, as websites are blocked, domains lost, and content disappears from access simply due to being placed on a blocked register or because hosting becomes unsustainable once blocked.
Taken as a whole, the recent developments point to an accelerating trajectory: from selective content blocking toward full‑scale control of traffic, routing, platforms, communications and architecture — a model akin to what some describe as a Russian version of the "Great Firewall" of China.
What explains the Russian state's drive toward tighter internet control and isolation? Several overlapping motivations are evident.
First, the conflict in Ukraine and related information‑war dynamics fed into official arguments about cybersecurity, external threats, foreign interference, "fake news," and "unreliable information." The Time article quotes the Russian legislature's explanatory note referring to the U.S. national cyber‑security strategy and Russia's need for "protective measures to ensure the long‑term stable operation of the Internet in Russia."
Second, sanctions, withdrawal of Western technology companies, and reliance on domestic infrastructure created both pressure and opportunity for the Russian authorities to advance digital‑sovereignty goals. The blocking of foreign platforms and services is thereby part of a broader push to reduce reliance on global platforms and assert national control over data, platforms and infrastructure. The Reuters piece on the Ookla block cites Russia's ambition for "digital sovereignty" by promoting home‑grown services.
Third, the state seeks to reduce the risk that independent media, opposition voices, religious minorities or civil‑society mobilization can leverage the internet to coordinate, disseminate dissent or share alternative narratives — particularly in wartime or politically sensitive contexts. The HRW report explains how internet shutdowns around protests or elections have become more common.
Fourth, increasing commercial and digital activity in Russia — banking, shopping, ride‑hailing, mobile apps — means that control of infrastructure and data becomes an economic asset and a tool of state governance. Disruptions thus affect not just political speech but the wider economy, giving the state an additional lever of influence. HRW cites that failed transactions, disrupted taxi apps or banking services are already outcomes of the state's experiments with censorship technology.
Finally, the narrative of protecting "traditional values," patriotism, the war effort, and state symbols plays a role. The HRW report describes how state‑funded social‑advertising campaigns (via domestic tech companies) promote pro‑military messages, service to the army, and support for the war in Ukraine.
Together, these drivers point to a calculus that the state sees the internet not just as a telecoms infrastructure but as a domain of control — one whose architecture, user‑flows and services must align with political, security and ideological priorities.
Despite the substantial investment in infrastructure, legal controls and regulatory pressure, the Russian internet model faces several challenges and uncertainties. First, the co‑option of domestic platforms and the substitution of foreign services is not seamless: many independent users still seek VPNs, proxies or other circumvention tools; many companies seek to operate globally; and technical workaround efforts persist. Indeed, the Wired article (though older) discussed open‑source VPNs developed to out‑manoeuvre Russian censorship.
Second, the heavy reliance on state‑controlled or state‑tethered service‑providers introduces fragility: in cases of misconfiguration or state experiments with censorship technology, services may fail entirely, causing real‑world disruption to commerce, banking, communications or emergency services. HRW documents such collateral damage to taxi apps, state websites and online banking functions.
Third, as Russia pushes toward full control and isolation, it risks isolating its internet ecosystem from global innovation, investment and connectivity. The national DNS alternative, state routing of traffic and isolation from global root servers raises concerns about fragmentation of the internet and degradation of connectivity and performance for end‑users. Wikipedia notes that the national DNS could be a single point of failure, and that disruption of global DNSSEC updates triggered problems for Russian users in January 2024.
Fourth, legal and human‑rights backlash, both domestic and international, remains a risk. While the Russian state may invoke national security or war‑time necessity, its actions conflict with Russia's treaty obligations (e.g., under the ICCPR) and raise the prospect of reputational, diplomatic and economic costs. The HRW report emphasises that state policy undermines rights of expression, information, privacy and assembly.
Fifth, user behaviour and technological change may mitigate some of the state's ambitions. Tech‑savvy users may adapt; encrypted or anonymised protocols evolve; global pressure or corporate resistance may constrain some of the regulation's worst excesses; and domestic dissent — though suppressed — may find alternative channels.
Looking ahead, some of the key questions are: will the Russian state manage to enforce a fully sovereign internet that functions smoothly for most users while remaining isolated from global flows? Will the costs of doing so — economic, social, infrastructural — become burdensome? How will domestic dissent evolve in response to increasing digital isolation? And will international actors, tech companies or civil‑society organisations find pathways to push back or support alternative connectivity?
In November 2025, regulatory proposals suggest the Kremlin intends to give Roskomnadzor power from March 1 2026 to disconnect the Russian internet from the global network without court decision. This marks a strategic turning‑point: the Russian model is shifting from "control and filtering within the global internet" toward "strategic disconnection and national‑internet isolation."
At the same time, the technical and human‑rights costs of such moves may increase over time, especially if user experience, connectivity, innovation and freedom of expression deteriorate. The equilibrium between state control, user expectations, global connectivity and economic functionality will be tested.
One open area remains the religious and civil‑society dimension: websites of minority belief groups, independent religious publishers, and communities using the internet for organizing continue to face blocking, deletion and chilling effects. The Forum 18 research flags this dimension and suggests that religious freedom is increasingly limited in the digital domain.
In sum, Russia's internet censorship regime is no longer simply a matter of site‑blocking or blog‑monitoring. It has evolved into a layered, systemic architecture of control: legal mandates for platforms and hosting, monitoring of traffic, consolidation of infrastructure, routing and domain control, selective or wholesale shutdowns, promotion of domestic alternatives, and an overriding narrative of security and sovereignty. The result is a progressively isolated information environment in which independent access to foreign platforms and media is increasingly constrained, where the technical means of circumvention are themselves under pressure, and where the domestic internet becomes a vector of state control.
From a human‑rights perspective, the stakes are high: the ability of citizens to access independent information, to communicate securely, to participate in public debate, to access religious or civil‑society content, to engage in commerce and mobility in a connected world — all of these are at risk of being reconfigured under state doctrine. As the architectural control deepens, what began as blocking of a few websites has become a broader transformation of the digital public sphere in Russia.
The story of internet censorship in Russia is a story of evolution: from content blocking and takedowns toward full‑scale infrastructure control, network isolation, substitution of foreign platforms, and the creation of a state‑managed digital ecosystem. It is a story of how a modern internet society can be re‑engineered — not just via laws that dictate content removal, but via deep technical control of routing, domain systems, certificates, exchange points, hosting, platform architecture and user flows.
While the foundational laws and tools have been in place for years, the pace and breadth of change post‑2022 mark a distinct escalation: shutdowns are more frequent, routing‑control tools more sophisticated, domestic replacements more actively promoted, and the goal of a "sovereign internet" more clearly articulated.
For users inside Russia, the consequences are tangible: difficulty accessing foreign platforms, need for VPNs that may not work, disrupted services, increased migration to domestic services, higher risk of surveillance and interception, narrowing of public debate, and limitations on religious or civil‑society expression.
For the global community and for digital‑rights defenders, the Russian case raises urgent questions about how internet openness, cross‑border connectivity and independent information flows can be preserved in an era when states increasingly view the internet as both an infrastructure of commerce and a domain of control.
In creating a parallel or isolated digital sphere, Russia is signalling a broader shift: from internet as platform of openness to internet as instrument of governance. The challenge ahead is whether the balance of control, user rights, innovation, economic participation and global connectivity will tip toward one side or another — and what that will mean for the future of digital life in Russia, and for models of internet governance elsewhere.